The Problem of Free Will Solved
My humble, but 100% correct, contribution to the free will debate
The following is an excerpt from an interview I did with Pablo Malo of the New Evolutionary Enlightenment, where we discussed my first book, Darwin, God and the Meaning of Life. The excerpt is about one of my favorite philosophical topics: the problem of free will. Specifically, it’s a brief overview of my solution to that problem - a solution I’ll expand on in a multi-part series I’m planning about the free will issue. Hope you have no real choice but to enjoy the post!
Pablo Malo: “The book was published in 2010. Have you changed your mind about anything since then?”
Yes and no. My approach to the free will issue has changed a little. I argued in the book that free will is an illusion. I was talking about one particular brand of free will: libertarian free will. According to proponents of libertarian free will, for any choice we make, we could have chosen otherwise, even in identical circumstances. For example, we could have taken the freeway instead of the back route home, even if the entire universe were molecule-for-molecule identical at the time of our choice, and even if our brain states and mental states were identical. Confusingly, not only could we have chosen otherwise, but the choice wouldn’t just have been random.
I argued in the book that this kind of contra-causal free will is the true definition of free will, and that it’s an illusion. I still think it’s an illusion, but I now prefer to frame the whole issue differently.
There are two main definitions of free will in common usage. There’s libertarian free will, but there’s also compatibilist free will. Compatibilist free will is the kind of free will we invoke when we say things like “The defendant wasn’t forced to rob the bank; he did it of his own free will.” In saying this, we’re not taking a stand on the metaphysical question of contra-causal agency; we’re just saying that robbing the bank was voluntary, uncoerced behavior, and thus that it would be appropriate and useful to hold the robber accountable for his actions. That’s compatibilist free will.
Which is the true definition of free will? There isn’t one! Rather than insisting that one definition is correct and other not, I now prefer to say that there are two legitimate definitions – libertarian free will and compatibilist free will – and that the first is an illusion but the second is not. This saves a lot of unnecessary arguments about what free will really is. And that’s useful, because most compatibilists and most deniers of libertarian free will agree on the important facts – namely that contra-causal free will is impossible, but that people engage in voluntary, uncoerced behavior for which they ought to be held accountable. The only real disagreement is about how to define free will, which isn’t a particularly interesting question. Why not just skip it by accepting that there are two legitimate definitions, and dealing with each on its own merits?
More on Free Will
As mentioned, I’m planning a multi-part series on the problem of free will. In the meantime, for those who want to dig deeper into the issue, here’s my patented Problem-of-Free-Will Starter Kit…
Sam Harris: We don’t have free will.
Daniel Dennett: Yes, we do.
Harris vs. Dennett:
Hi Steve, do you believe that Compatibilist free will is JUST a useful social convention (an idea, mediated by biology and society, with causal properties of its own)? Or are you saying that you believe it’s actually possible for voluntary choice? I am not sure I see how Compatibilist is anything but a (potentially useful and very important) fiction. How would a voluntary choice even be possible? Who’s making it? Are the two free wills real different Natural Kinds? Or are they just different Conventional Labels? Thanks for covering a fascinating topic. Looking forward to hearing your ideas more in future posts!
Hi Steve!
The obsession with "holding people accountable" stems from an evolved moral intuition, likely shaped by our need for social cohesion and group survival. However, we shouldn't mistake this intuition for proof of the existence of compatibilist free will, which merely distinguishes between coerced and uncoerced actions. Coercion is just another factor, like any environmental, genetic, or situational influence that affects behavior.
For example, consider this oversimplified example: a significant portion of violent crime is committed by individuals with low impulse control, a fairly inborn trait. The distinction we should focus on is not whether the actions were coerced, but whether the person had the genuine capacity to act otherwise. Everything we know suggests that this is not the case, while philosophers continue to struggle with the logical defense of what seems to me to be wishful thinking.
Therefore, the legal system should move away from punishing individuals based on a presumed ability to have acted differently and instead focus on more scientifically based approaches. This would include using behavioral interventions to modify destructive patterns, protecting society from those prone to violent behavior, and rehabilitating offenders in ways that address the underlying causes of their actions.
What do you think?