The Problem of Free Will Solved
The Problem of Free Will Solved
My humble, but 100% correct, contribution to the free will debate
The following is an excerpt from an interview I did with Pablo Malo of the New Evolutionary Enlightenment, where we discussed my first book, Darwin, God and the Meaning of Life. The excerpt is about one of my favorite philosophical topics: the problem of free will. Specifically, it’s a brief overview of my solution to that problem - a solution I’ll expand on in a multi-part series I’m planning about the free will issue. Hope you have no real choice but to enjoy the post!
Pablo Malo: “The book was published in 2010. Have you changed your mind about anything since then?”
Yes and no. My approach to the free will issue has changed a little. I argued in the book that free will is an illusion. I was talking about one particular brand of free will: libertarian free will. According to proponents of libertarian free will, for any choice we make, we could have chosen otherwise, even in identical circumstances. For example, we could have taken the freeway instead of the back route home, even if the entire universe were molecule-for-molecule identical at the time of our choice, and even if our brain states and mental states were identical. Confusingly, not only could we have chosen otherwise, but the choice wouldn’t just have been random.
I argued in the book that this kind of contra-causal free will is the true definition of free will, and that it’s an illusion. I still think it’s an illusion, but I now prefer to frame the whole issue differently.
There are two main definitions of free will in common usage. There’s libertarian free will, but there’s also compatibilist free will. Compatibilist free will is the kind of free will we invoke when we say things like “The defendant wasn’t forced to rob the bank; he did it of his own free will.” In saying this, we’re not taking a stand on the metaphysical question of contra-causal agency; we’re just saying that robbing the bank was voluntary, uncoerced behavior, and thus that it would be appropriate and useful to hold the robber accountable for his actions. That’s compatibilist free will.
Which is the true definition of free will? There isn’t one! Rather than insisting that one definition is correct and other not, I now prefer to say that there are two legitimate definitions – libertarian free will and compatibilist free will – and that the first is an illusion but the second is not. This saves a lot of unnecessary arguments about what free will really is. And that’s useful, because most compatibilists and most deniers of libertarian free will agree on the important facts – namely that contra-causal free will is impossible, but that people engage in voluntary, uncoerced behavior for which they ought to be held accountable. The only real disagreement is about how to define free will, which isn’t a particularly interesting question. Why not just skip it by accepting that there are two legitimate definitions, and dealing with each on its own merits?
More on Free Will
As mentioned, I’m planning a multi-part series on the problem of free will. In the meantime, for those who want to dig deeper into the issue, here’s my patented Problem-of-Free-Will Starter Kit…
Sam Harris: We don’t have free will.
Daniel Dennett: Yes, we do.
Harris vs. Dennett:
Hi Steve, do you believe that Compatibilist free will is JUST a useful social convention (an idea, mediated by biology and society, with causal properties of its own)? Or are you saying that you believe it’s actually possible for voluntary choice? I am not sure I see how Compatibilist is anything but a (potentially useful and very important) fiction. How would a voluntary choice even be possible? Who’s making it? Are the two free wills real different Natural Kinds? Or are they just different Conventional Labels? Thanks for covering a fascinating topic. Looking forward to hearing your ideas more in future posts!
“In saying this, we’re not taking a stand on the metaphysical question of contra-causal agency; we’re just saying that robbing the bank was voluntary, uncoerced behavior, and thus that it would be appropriate and useful to hold the robber accountable for his actions.”
This is where I think the fight over the redefinition of free will matters because I believe as societies we mete out punishment in general based on the belief that the perpetrator did so with *libertarian free will* rather than the much more constrained compatibilist version. We are going far beyond trying to just incentivize better behaviour in people. If that were our main motive we would be invoking many more positive incentives I think.
I would’ve much preferred if Dennett et al had based their arguments on defending the concept of ‘uncoerced will’ which I will happily concede exists. I think it would make this whole debate a lot clearer.
Just my two cents.