Hi Steve, do you believe that Compatibilist free will is JUST a useful social convention (an idea, mediated by biology and society, with causal properties of its own)? Or are you saying that you believe it’s actually possible for voluntary choice? I am not sure I see how Compatibilist is anything but a (potentially useful and very important) fiction. How would a voluntary choice even be possible? Who’s making it? Are the two free wills real different Natural Kinds? Or are they just different Conventional Labels? Thanks for covering a fascinating topic. Looking forward to hearing your ideas more in future posts!
Hi Michael! I don't think compatibilist free will is a useful fiction; I think it refers to something real - namely the capacity to make choices and engage in voluntary behavior that it's useful to hold people responsible for.
To be clear, though, when I talk about choices and voluntary behavior, I don't mean that these things are miraculously beyond the realm of cause and effect. Like every (non-subatomic) event in the universe, our choices and voluntary behavior are caused and thus ultimately mechanical.
Still, there's a meaningful distinction between the mechanical behavior we call voluntary (e.g., deciding to commit a crime) and the mechanical behavior we call non-voluntary behavior (e.g., reflexes). And a common, useful definition of free will refers simply to the former.
Thanks Steve. I’ll have to read your future posts and see if something changes in how I think about this. I agree that there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary behaviour. I’m not sure that it has to do with free will though. Whether it has to do with prediction errors, etc. I don’t t know. Thank you for covering this fascinating but tricky area!
The obsession with "holding people accountable" stems from an evolved moral intuition, likely shaped by our need for social cohesion and group survival. However, we shouldn't mistake this intuition for proof of the existence of compatibilist free will, which merely distinguishes between coerced and uncoerced actions. Coercion is just another factor, like any environmental, genetic, or situational influence that affects behavior.
For example, consider this oversimplified example: a significant portion of violent crime is committed by individuals with low impulse control, a fairly inborn trait. The distinction we should focus on is not whether the actions were coerced, but whether the person had the genuine capacity to act otherwise. Everything we know suggests that this is not the case, while philosophers continue to struggle with the logical defense of what seems to me to be wishful thinking.
Therefore, the legal system should move away from punishing individuals based on a presumed ability to have acted differently and instead focus on more scientifically based approaches. This would include using behavioral interventions to modify destructive patterns, protecting society from those prone to violent behavior, and rehabilitating offenders in ways that address the underlying causes of their actions.
I agree with most of that. I agree that we have an instinctive tendency to want to punish people who wrong us or others (although I don't take that as proof of compatibilist free will). And I agree that we should move away from punishing people based on notions of libertarian free will, and use scientifically informed approaches as much as possible.
I also like the idea that "coerced" vs. "uncoerced" should be seen as an instance of a deeper distinction between "could have done otherwise" and "couldn't have." Maybe that would be a better way to define compatibilist free will. I'll have to have a think about that...
One complication, though: The "could have done otherwise" legal standard will be hard to implement in practice. After all, the world doesn't divide easily into those who could have done otherwise (in the compatibilist's sense) and those who couldn't. Traits like self-control and impulsivity are distributed continuously.
“In saying this, we’re not taking a stand on the metaphysical question of contra-causal agency; we’re just saying that robbing the bank was voluntary, uncoerced behavior, and thus that it would be appropriate and useful to hold the robber accountable for his actions.”
This is where I think the fight over the redefinition of free will matters because I believe as societies we mete out punishment in general based on the belief that the perpetrator did so with *libertarian free will* rather than the much more constrained compatibilist version. We are going far beyond trying to just incentivize better behaviour in people. If that were our main motive we would be invoking many more positive incentives I think.
I would’ve much preferred if Dennett et al had based their arguments on defending the concept of ‘uncoerced will’ which I will happily concede exists. I think it would make this whole debate a lot clearer.
Hi Jason! I agree that people sometimes mete out punishments based on a tacit notion of libertarian free will and ultimate just desserts. But people also sometimes say things like "He did it of his own free will" purely to mean that the person wasn't coerced, and without any notion of the human will as an uncaused cause or the like. Given that that both usages of the phrase free will - uncaused cause and uncoerced cause - are in circulation, I'm happy just to accept both, and evaluate each separately.
It's not that I'm necessarily against redefining terms or choosing among definitions. It's just that, when it comes to the free will issue, the effort never gets us anywhere. Some people are adamant that the one true meaning should be libertarian free will (e.g., for the reason you mentioned), while others are equally adamant that compatibilist free will should be (e.g., because libertarian free will is incoherent). It's an unwinnable fight, so I'd rather just stick to the substantive issues.
These discussions always remind me of two expressions: "He did it of his own free will", vs something like, "Knowing that family, he never had a chance" (genetics + non-shared environment). Looking forward to your series.
Hi Steve, do you believe that Compatibilist free will is JUST a useful social convention (an idea, mediated by biology and society, with causal properties of its own)? Or are you saying that you believe it’s actually possible for voluntary choice? I am not sure I see how Compatibilist is anything but a (potentially useful and very important) fiction. How would a voluntary choice even be possible? Who’s making it? Are the two free wills real different Natural Kinds? Or are they just different Conventional Labels? Thanks for covering a fascinating topic. Looking forward to hearing your ideas more in future posts!
Hi Michael! I don't think compatibilist free will is a useful fiction; I think it refers to something real - namely the capacity to make choices and engage in voluntary behavior that it's useful to hold people responsible for.
To be clear, though, when I talk about choices and voluntary behavior, I don't mean that these things are miraculously beyond the realm of cause and effect. Like every (non-subatomic) event in the universe, our choices and voluntary behavior are caused and thus ultimately mechanical.
Still, there's a meaningful distinction between the mechanical behavior we call voluntary (e.g., deciding to commit a crime) and the mechanical behavior we call non-voluntary behavior (e.g., reflexes). And a common, useful definition of free will refers simply to the former.
Thanks Steve. I’ll have to read your future posts and see if something changes in how I think about this. I agree that there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary behaviour. I’m not sure that it has to do with free will though. Whether it has to do with prediction errors, etc. I don’t t know. Thank you for covering this fascinating but tricky area!
I share your opinion.
Hi Steve!
The obsession with "holding people accountable" stems from an evolved moral intuition, likely shaped by our need for social cohesion and group survival. However, we shouldn't mistake this intuition for proof of the existence of compatibilist free will, which merely distinguishes between coerced and uncoerced actions. Coercion is just another factor, like any environmental, genetic, or situational influence that affects behavior.
For example, consider this oversimplified example: a significant portion of violent crime is committed by individuals with low impulse control, a fairly inborn trait. The distinction we should focus on is not whether the actions were coerced, but whether the person had the genuine capacity to act otherwise. Everything we know suggests that this is not the case, while philosophers continue to struggle with the logical defense of what seems to me to be wishful thinking.
Therefore, the legal system should move away from punishing individuals based on a presumed ability to have acted differently and instead focus on more scientifically based approaches. This would include using behavioral interventions to modify destructive patterns, protecting society from those prone to violent behavior, and rehabilitating offenders in ways that address the underlying causes of their actions.
What do you think?
Hi ABC!
I agree with most of that. I agree that we have an instinctive tendency to want to punish people who wrong us or others (although I don't take that as proof of compatibilist free will). And I agree that we should move away from punishing people based on notions of libertarian free will, and use scientifically informed approaches as much as possible.
I also like the idea that "coerced" vs. "uncoerced" should be seen as an instance of a deeper distinction between "could have done otherwise" and "couldn't have." Maybe that would be a better way to define compatibilist free will. I'll have to have a think about that...
One complication, though: The "could have done otherwise" legal standard will be hard to implement in practice. After all, the world doesn't divide easily into those who could have done otherwise (in the compatibilist's sense) and those who couldn't. Traits like self-control and impulsivity are distributed continuously.
“In saying this, we’re not taking a stand on the metaphysical question of contra-causal agency; we’re just saying that robbing the bank was voluntary, uncoerced behavior, and thus that it would be appropriate and useful to hold the robber accountable for his actions.”
This is where I think the fight over the redefinition of free will matters because I believe as societies we mete out punishment in general based on the belief that the perpetrator did so with *libertarian free will* rather than the much more constrained compatibilist version. We are going far beyond trying to just incentivize better behaviour in people. If that were our main motive we would be invoking many more positive incentives I think.
I would’ve much preferred if Dennett et al had based their arguments on defending the concept of ‘uncoerced will’ which I will happily concede exists. I think it would make this whole debate a lot clearer.
Just my two cents.
Hi Jason! I agree that people sometimes mete out punishments based on a tacit notion of libertarian free will and ultimate just desserts. But people also sometimes say things like "He did it of his own free will" purely to mean that the person wasn't coerced, and without any notion of the human will as an uncaused cause or the like. Given that that both usages of the phrase free will - uncaused cause and uncoerced cause - are in circulation, I'm happy just to accept both, and evaluate each separately.
It's not that I'm necessarily against redefining terms or choosing among definitions. It's just that, when it comes to the free will issue, the effort never gets us anywhere. Some people are adamant that the one true meaning should be libertarian free will (e.g., for the reason you mentioned), while others are equally adamant that compatibilist free will should be (e.g., because libertarian free will is incoherent). It's an unwinnable fight, so I'd rather just stick to the substantive issues.
What if we split the difference and compatibilists adopt the term ‘freeish will” 😉
😂
You've got yourself a deal!
I’m glad that you’re revisiting and explaining this again and looking forward to the updated treatment.
🙏
These discussions always remind me of two expressions: "He did it of his own free will", vs something like, "Knowing that family, he never had a chance" (genetics + non-shared environment). Looking forward to your series.
Yeah, it's interesting - people seem to have conflicting intuitions about free will.